The Donald Trump administration’s most dramatic act so far has been to upend US relationship with Europe. The alliance between the US and Europe has been the centerpiece of American foreign policy since 1945, crystallized in the establishment of NATO in 1949, which committed its members, most crucially the US, to defend any member attacked by another country.
The incoming Donald Trump administration will not be a rerun of his first presidency. The incoming administration in the US will possibly mean: the end of post-1945 American multilateralism; a growing gulf between Europe and the US; the end of the Ukraine war; a trade war with China (but not a hot one) which will fail in its objectives; and major pressure on all US allies (European and East Asian) to pay for part of their defense. It will mark a paradigm shift on a far bigger scale and of far greater consequence than previous such shifts like the Thatcher neo-liberal revolution in the 1980s. It will mark a major shift to the right in US politics, a large-scale retreat from America’s global role, and a return to America as the overwhelming priority.
The most obvious expression of the new security situation is the fact that two major wars are presently being fought: the Russian action against Ukraine, which began two and a half years ago; and Israel’s assault on Gaza, which started one year ago, both of which have resulted in a major loss of life. The US and the EU have played a crucial role in supplying arms to Ukraine, thereby greatly widening the latter’s reach and military capability. Israel’s war on Gaza has long been threatening to become a regional war. Finally, in neither case can we yet see the possible end of the war.
Modernization has become one of the great subjects of discussion in China. Ever since the century of humiliation, the quest for modernization had eluded China. By the time of the revolution in 1949, China lagged hugely behind the West. The need to modernize was China’s greatest challenge. In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping learned from the Asian tigers and the West. His answer was to open up to the rest of the world, most notably the West.
In 1978, China made the decision to open up and turn outward. This has been fundamental to China’s extraordinary economic transformation over the last four decades and more. The turn outward, we should remind ourselves, represented a rejection of the “socialism in one country” thinking that had shaped Chinese policy after the 1949 revolution. The new approach was hugely consequential. China came to see itself as an integral part of the global economy, rather than, as before, a part of the socialist bloc, or, more narrowly even, pretty much on its own. China’s new approach was to measure itself against the world, and, more crucially, the advanced economies of the US, Europe, and Japan.
It has long been accepted, at least in theory, that climate change poses the greatest threat to humanity. With each passing year, new record heatwaves, devastating floods, deadly fires and rising sea levels have reinforced near-unanimous warnings from climate scientists that our present way of living is fast becoming unsustainable. However, it is one thing to agree in words, but quite another to deliver the policies that will translate those words into effective action. This is now being dramatically tested by the response of the US and the EU to the arrival of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in their markets.
Over the last two years, there have mounting accusations in the West that China is guilty of dumping its goods at uncompetitive prices on Western markets. This criticism has largely been directed at the new green technology industries, in particular solar power, wind turbines, and, most notably, electric vehicles. It is true that China, especially in a much earlier period, gave large-scale financial assistance to EV manufacturers and, until the end of 2022, subsidised the purchases of EVs, as quite a few other countries did. But the idea that these subsidies are the reason for the remarkable competitiveness of Chinese EVs is a fantasy.
The shift in the attitude of the Philippine government toward the US and China should not come as a great surprise. The Philippines has long been closer to the US than any other ASEAN country. In 1951 it signed a defense treaty with the US, has been host to five US military bases, and the two militaries enjoy a very close relationship. The Philippine government’s submission to the Hague tribunal on the South China Sea was a result of close collaboration with the US, which was, in effect, its joint author. However, the unexpected election of Rodrigo Duterte as Philippine president in 2016 changed the dynamic. Duterte refused to support the Hague judgment and instead expressed a desire to distance the Philippines from the US and strengthen ties with China, ultimately undermining the Hague judgment.
Complaints have been mounting in the West, especially Western Europe, about the threat of cheap Chinese manufacturing products flooding Western markets. The main concern is electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind turbines, the key green technologies in the fight against climate change. A common accusation is that China has provided these industries with unfair state subsides which bestow on them an unfair market advantage.
There has been constant low-level sniping in the West against China’s record on climate change, in particular its expansion of coal mining, and its target of 2060 rather than 2050 for carbon zero. I have viewed this with mild if irritated amusement, because when it comes to results, then China, we can be sure, will deliver and most Western countries will fall short, probably well short. It is now becoming clear, however, that we will not have to wait much longer to judge their relative performances. The answer is already near at hand.