Martin Jacques argues that the UN remains the most representative platform for global dialogue but must be reformed to reflect today’s realities. He warns that any retreat by the US by the UN would harm global cooperation. He welcomed China’s consistent support for UN agencies and multilateralism.
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The World War II and the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression are an integral part of the same historical phenomenon. In the West they may be treated as separate entities, but they became inextricably intertwined as a part of the same global conflict against fascism, one based in Europe, the other in East Asia. We should think of both of them as part of the Second World War (1931-45). They resulted in a huge loss of life, both civilian and military, especially in China and the Soviet Union, but the world that emerged from it, with the benefit of hindsight, was vastly better than the world of the many decades that preceded it.
When the US administration seeks to redefine America’s relationship with the world, including Europe, the latter’s response has been one of damage limitation. It has desperately sought to persuade the US to continue supporting the war against Russia in Ukraine, while, in order to mollify Washington, the European members of NATO have unanimously agreed to increase their defence expenditure to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. The EU has failed to take any serious initiative on tariffs, despite having had over three months to do so. Meanwhile the US administration is once more on the warpath, threatening a tariff increase of 30 percent on August 1.
The first Trump administration signalled the birth of a powerful new movement in US politics, albeit one that was often incoherent and divided. With the second Trump administration, the MAGA movement has come of age, its project is now much clearer. It represents a fundamental rupture in US politics, and Western politics more generally. What are its key characteristics?
One of the defining characteristics of US foreign policy since the beginning of China’s reform and opening-up has been its consistent underestimation of China. It never entertained the idea that China could become America’s equal, let alone surpass it. In fact, we have already arrived at the latter scenario. It is this that persuaded the Trump administration that the only solution was to junk America’s post-1945 foreign policy. America was losing and would continue to lose: a radical change of direction was needed. The first attempt was Trump 1.0. When Donald Trump won last November, a very different and far more extreme strategy was in place. It climaxed on April 9 when the Trump administration effectively called a halt on trade with China. Read more >
How, after nearly 76 years in power, can the Communist Party of China (CPC) be enjoying one of the most memorable periods in its history? Whether a Western government serves a relatively short period in office or a rather longer one, there are two main reasons why it becomes unpopular and loses office: first, it runs out of ideas; and second, the electorate decides it is time for a change. A major problem with this form of governance is that it breeds a short-term mentality among both the people and political parties.
The Donald Trump administration’s most dramatic act so far has been to upend US relationship with Europe. The alliance between the US and Europe has been the centerpiece of American foreign policy since 1945, crystallized in the establishment of NATO in 1949, which committed its members, most crucially the US, to defend any member attacked by another country.
The incoming Donald Trump administration will not be a rerun of his first presidency. The incoming administration in the US will possibly mean: the end of post-1945 American multilateralism; a growing gulf between Europe and the US; the end of the Ukraine war; a trade war with China (but not a hot one) which will fail in its objectives; and major pressure on all US allies (European and East Asian) to pay for part of their defense. It will mark a paradigm shift on a far bigger scale and of far greater consequence than previous such shifts like the Thatcher neo-liberal revolution in the 1980s. It will mark a major shift to the right in US politics, a large-scale retreat from America’s global role, and a return to America as the overwhelming priority.
The most obvious expression of the new security situation is the fact that two major wars are presently being fought: the Russian action against Ukraine, which began two and a half years ago; and Israel’s assault on Gaza, which started one year ago, both of which have resulted in a major loss of life. The US and the EU have played a crucial role in supplying arms to Ukraine, thereby greatly widening the latter’s reach and military capability. Israel’s war on Gaza has long been threatening to become a regional war. Finally, in neither case can we yet see the possible end of the war.
Modernization has become one of the great subjects of discussion in China. Ever since the century of humiliation, the quest for modernization had eluded China. By the time of the revolution in 1949, China lagged hugely behind the West. The need to modernize was China’s greatest challenge. In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping learned from the Asian tigers and the West. His answer was to open up to the rest of the world, most notably the West.